Junior Fellow 2004-05
Tobias Hoffmann
The Catholic University of America
Practical Rationality and the “good of virtue”
according to Aquinas
How can an ethical theory both aim at objectivity and take into
account
the contingency of human behavior and of the historical and cultural
circumstances that condition human action? Aquinas’ understanding
of practical rationality offers an important contribution to this
question, for in his account, true practical knowledge is possible,
despite being conditioned by contingent factors. An important aspect
of Aquinas’ concept of practical rationality consists in the
fact that for the individual, practical knowledge
not only has a moral component as a guide for actions, but also
is itself the fruit of moral character. In the concrete situation,
practical knowledge is largely relative to the virtuous agent. This
does not, however, impair the possibility of having objective or
true practical knowledge.
The interrelation between practical knowledge and the virtuous
agent can be seen from different perspectives. Negatively, it can
be seen from the viewpoint of the corruption of practical knowledge.
Aquinas studies this in the Aristotelian context of incontinence,
intemperance and imprudence, and in the framework of the Patristic
tradition regarding conscience.
Positively, this interrelation regards the standards for morality
and the conditions under which they are known. In order for practical
reason to function as a rule of action, it needs to be informed
by prudence. The virtue of prudence requires the possession of the
other moral virtues. Aquinas can therefore say with Aristotle that
the standard for the good in particular instances is the virtuous
person; it is by virtue of his correct understanding of the good
that a virtuous person embodies the standard of the good.
A further perspective that sheds light on the above mentioned interrelation
is to consider the notion of moral goodness. For Aquinas, something
pertains to the moral order by virtue of its relation to practical
reason. Actions which have a natural goodness (e.g., an adulterous
act qua act, i.e., qua being) are judged to be
morally good or bad only in their respect to reason. Moral goodness
is not an ontological feature of something, and it cannot be separated
from an agent who exercises practical reason by relating his or
her actions to an ultimate end.
In summary, my research is aimed at bringing out how both the content
of practical knowledge and its object, the moral good, become specified
for moral acts through a particular moral agent who exercises practical
rationality. Despite this relatedness, practical knowledge can attain
objectivity, that is, “practical truth.” [“…
obiectum intellectus practici non est bonum sed verum relatum ad
opus” De veritate q. 22 a. 10 ad 4]
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