Junior Faculty Fellow 2002-03
Bernd Goebel (Philosophy)
Hannover Institute of Philosophical Research
From Imago Dei to Absolute Freedom:
The Origins of Modern Moral Anthropology
in 13th- and early 14th-century Theology
The introduction of the notion of subjective rights
by 17th-century natural rights theorists is often seen as the birth
of our modern self-understanding as moral subjects endowed with dignity.
What I, however, would like to show is that the origins of this idea
are rather to be found in late medieval philosophy and theology. In
particular, I will focus on the development of two concepts: man’s
being an image of God, and freedom of the will.
Taking up Saint Anselm’s and Saint Bernard’s
renewal of Augustinian symbolic anthropology, subsequent chief representatives
of medieval Augustinianism such as Alexander of Hales, Saint Bonaventure
and Matthew of Acquasparta worked out the metaphysical foundations of
the notion of our being moral subjects. One of their main conceptual
innovations is the development of what may be called “ontology
of the person.” It goes beyond Aristotle in speaking explicitly
of the “moral being” (esse morale) man enjoys in virtue
of his freedom and moral responsibility. The anthropology of these theologians
is opposed to the rival conception of Thomas Aquinas in that it is voluntaristic
rather than intellectualistic (Augustinian rather than Aristotelian).
Yet their voluntarism is still embedded in a theological order. Freedom
in the strongest sense, as self-determination by one’s will, is
the privilege of those who by God’s grace are morally good. Having
lost his “moral being,” the sinner may only hope for God’s
restitution of his former ontological status, that is, for his fully
being an image of God again.
In later Franciscan theologians, however, a major change occurs. Thus,
Peter John Olivi, John Duns Scotus and others were to develop a new
concept of the human will and its freedom. Free will came to be seen
as a faculty of absolute self-determination common to all men, while
freedom was considered the essence of man. This breach within medieval
anthropology will need to be located as exactly as possible. The inner
and outer reasons that brought it about will be explored and subjected
to a philosophical critique. Most importantly, these are the problem
of moral responsibility and the relationship between freedom and grace
on the one hand, and the controversies on poverty and on the primacy,
the condemnations of Aristotelianism, and the debates with the followers
of Aquinas, on the other.
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